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score voting gets better results than the alternatives with ANY AMOUNT OF STRATEGIC VOTING.

https://www.rangevoting.org/BayRegsFig

https://electionscience.org/research-hub/tactical-voting-bas...


> That gains it a point but there are much better methods.

utterly false.

https://electionscience.github.io/vse-sim/vse-graph.html


> I vote my actual ranking

no you don't. take a warren supporter who votes biden to stop trump. that person ranks:

biden 1st, warren 2nd, trump 3rd

they don't want warren to be a spoiler.

http://rangevoting.net/TarrIrv


That person is not me. Don't tell me what I do.

that person is STRATEGIC VOTERS, who are about 90% of the electorate. even if you want to vote honestly, you're still subject to the whims of other voters.

indeed, practically the only thing that matters in a voting method is the aggregate affect of what it achieves in light of other voters. YOUR vote will almost never make a difference. you could upgrade voting methods in exchange for giving up your right to vote, and you'd still be drastically better off.


> that person is STRATEGIC VOTERS

When I said "I" I meant me. This one person. And I was talking about that specific scenario.

It wasn't a statement about "strategic voters" in other scenarios.


i know. and my point was, that's irrational. other voters determine the election result YOU have to live with.

score voting is extremely good.

https://www.rangevoting.org/BayRegsFig

compressing it to approval voting doesn't hurt very much and makes the ballot extremely simple.

> I don't see how.

i just showed you how. better average voter satisfaction, better resistance to strategy, etc.

https://www.rangevoting.org/BayRegsFig

not to mention radically simpler:

https://web.archive.org/web/20190219005733/

https://sites.google.com/a/electology.org/www/approval-votin...

IRV is a strategic mess that maintains a two party system.

wonk.blog/duopoly

https://clayshentrup.medium.com/later-no-harm-72c44e145510

https://clayshentrup.medium.com/star-voting-is-simpler-than-...


> i just showed you how.

That comes across as weirdly aggressive when you're referring to earlier in the same post. Like I'm dumb for not somehow seeing that before I finished my own post.

Also what's the definition of honesty for approval voting? Where am I supposed to draw the line?

The chart is pretty but I'm not trusting that chart without a lot more info.

> IRV is a strategic mess

I didn't say I want instant runoff in particular.


it doesn't really matter how you define "honest". what matters is how people actually vote. the only really crucial distinction for "honest" versus "strategic" is that "honest" can't consider viability. in the simulations, we just use "approve everyone you like more than average". optimal strategy is to approve everyone you like more than the expected utility of the winner. https://rangevoting.net/RVstrat6

here's lots of detail. you can run the code for yourself. https://www.rangevoting.org/BayRegDum.html

here's a slightly different model from the late harvard stats phd, jameson quinn. https://electionscience.github.io/vse-sim/

don't "trust" anything. look at the data. you could also read the book "gaming the vote" by william poundstone.


thanks for actually knowing what you're talking about.

no it does not.

http://rangevoting.net/CoreSuppPocket https://wonk.blog/duopoly

approval voting actually DOES and it is better in every other way too.


preach, brudda.



nailed it.


a common fallacy of basic logic.

with FPTP, strategic voting means NOT voting for your favorite. so at the very least, you'd "vote for the person you'd normally support under FPTP, _plus_ everyone you like better".

but in real life, a lot of people will use intermediate scores.

https://www.rangevoting.org/RVstrat6


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