>I'd say this is the result of not understanding how CSPRNG works and how to use it safely.
My take from previous discussions is that once you seed a CSPRNG properly you can take secure random numbers from it forever. So in a linux server once /dev/urandom has been properly seeded you can take random numbers from it forever with no issues.
So if what they discovered in this research is that "Linux's /dev/urandom entropy pool often runs empty on servers" this shouldn't really be much of an issue.
My take from previous discussions is that once you seed a CSPRNG properly you can take secure random numbers from it forever. So in a linux server once /dev/urandom has been properly seeded you can take random numbers from it forever with no issues.
So if what they discovered in this research is that "Linux's /dev/urandom entropy pool often runs empty on servers" this shouldn't really be much of an issue.