This is nonsense. Ethereum is uninsurable. The turtles-all-the-way-down notion that you can wrap a bad "smart contract" in a bad "smart insurance contract" and buy Ethereum insurance from an Ethereum insurer and prove that there will be enough Ethereum there to make everyone whole economically should everything go to shit because a fundamental problem in Solidity lets anyone unilaterally blow the whole thing up...
I honestly don't know what to say about that. It's ludicrous.
Problems in Solidity are a systemic risk faced by all contracts and are thus not something that can be hedged within the system.
Correspondingly, fixes to VM bugs are the sort of thing that the hard fork mechanism is good for. Hard forks that fix flaky VM behavior are uncontroversial.
While there are many applications of insurance products, the use case I am referring to above has to do with specifically insuring the expected behavior of a smart contract.
Suppose I write a smart contract that "rounds up" a user's transactions for a day and donates the rest to charity. I describe the contract verbally as "This contract lists all the transactions your account made that day, rounds to the nearest ETH, and donates the difference to account xyz which is associated with the American Red Cross fundraising division.
There are several aspects of this contract to verify. First, does the logic in the code do what the verbal description says it does. Are there any mathematical errors? Can it run more than once in given 24 hour period? Is the id associated with the Red Cross actually linked to that organization?
If a trusted third party vetted the contract and claimed that its claims were true and that 800 people had used it that day to donate, I'd likely consider it worthwhile to trust that contract.
Similarly, if a third party offered an insurance smart contract that would charge me a tiny amount of Ether to guarantee that the contract would behave as expected within a 10 year period, I might feel comfortable buying that contract. If that third party was unknown to me I might rely on recommendations from others, etc.
The point is that trust builds upon trust. One sort of vetting can help buttress other layers of vetting. This is no different than trust in meatspace, only the characteristics of the blockchain make some kinds of trust easier to realize.
It may not be uninsurable, but pretty clearly trying to use insurance on the platform to insure against risk that are in some sense endemic to the platform seems quite misguided.
> but pretty clearly trying to use insurance on the platform to insure against risk that are in some sense endemic to the platform seems quite misguided
Absolutely, the risk posed by a malfunctioning VM is a systemic risk that applies to the entire platform. So there is a chance that contracts impacted by a VM bug could be unreliable across the pre and post bugfix VM. The insurance contract could be one of these.
However, all things considered, I think it's interesting to contemplate a binary future "contract" about whether there will be a VM-bug-necessitated ETH hard fork in the next 30 days. What would the ideal exchange be to take a position on that future? I think it would probably be a different, but largely similar, smart contracts platform very similar to ETH, possibly even ETC.
Notably the meatspace financial system does a horrible job at identifying much less hedging against systemic risks. Identification is hard because the interactions between multiple regulatory systems and ambiguous and variable enforcement mechanisms are nearly impossible to model or to understand. It's like having a bunch of inter-related contracts all of which run on their own buggy VM.
The meatspace system seems very stable until you realize that it's highly brittle. It's impossible to meaningfully measure firm solvency risk, because the behavior of the "VM" is so unpredictable.
> The meatspace system seems very stable until you realize that it's highly brittle. It's impossible to meaningfully measure firm solvency risk, because the behavior of the "VM" is so unpredictable.
Actually, it's not. Regulators and ratings companies do a pretty good job of it, and in extraordinary Great Recession type events there is usually concerted response to keep consumers from incurring any losses. Insured not getting paid due to counterparty issues is a blue moon, black swan risk for business, virtual never happens to consumers.
Regulators and ratings companies did a terrible job leading up to the 2008 crash, and people did have real losses. Some pensions got hit hard, for example. The loss doesn't have to come directly out of your bank account to have a real effect on you.
Exactly. Also, the cost of bad regulation is not just in the aftermath... it's mostly in the period leading up to the crash when so many billions of dollars were invested in the wrong stuff.
The great thing about the modern economy is that capital is readily available, but that doesn't mean that the massive misallocation of capital over a period of decades lacks significant consequences.
Many of the dollars mis-invested into real-estate related investments brought on by tax loophole, sloppy (if not corrupt) regulation of downside risk scenarios, and the undemocratic socialization of risk via the GSEs were all things that had a massive social cost.
To argue, as the GP does, that the regulation and management of the crisis was a success by pointing to a few selected asset prices that were the focal point of knee-jerk populist reactions to the problems is a fairly absurd way to claim success.
I honestly don't know what to say about that. It's ludicrous.